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Taiwan’s 2012 elections: Campaign, Predictions and Consequences 
By Dafydd Fell 
Back in March this year I wrote a piece for Brookings North East Asia Commentary looking 
ahead to next January’s national level elections in Taiwan. Now seven-eight months later 
and just over two months from voting day I thought this would be a good chance to revisit 
this important topic.  
It is all too common in the West to hear the complaint that elections do not matter. 
Fortunately we cannot say this about Taiwan. Since 2008 Ma Ying-jeou has brought about a 
radical transformation in cross-Strait relations and left an important mark on Taiwan’s 
modern history. It is very unlikely so much would have happened if Hsieh Chang-ting had 
won the presidency.  
So what is special about this campaign?  
Firstly, it is the first time that presidential and legislative elections have been held 
simultaneously, thus the campaign feels very different from previous contests.  
Based on my observation of the national press it feels like the Legislative Yuan campaign has 
completely disappeared, as it has been so overshadowed by presidential campaign. Previous 
legislative elections all received far more media attention. This is unfortunate as one of the 
important lessons of the DPP era was that parliamentary elections are as important as the 
presidential ones. A critical reason for why Chen Shui-bian achieved so little when president 
was that his party never controlled the Legislative Yuan.  
The importance of the Legislative Yuan means it needs real democratic scrutiny and it is not 
getting this in the current campaign. This term Ma had a huge legislative majority but has 
delivered very little in terms of domestic reforms. This has been a wasted opportunity.  
Over the years the DPP has tended to put too much stress on presidential elections and 
neglected legislative campaigning, and this year appears to have been no exception to this 
pattern. This has been a serious mistake in judgement as the Legislative Yuan represents the 
most effective institution for really checking the KMT.  
Secondly, this has been the least passionate presidential election so far in Taiwan’s history. 
In all four previous contests there was genuine voter passion for at least one of the tickets 
and on some occasions for two camps. I do not feel this kind of voter enthusiasm this time. 
Both have some catchy TV ads and slogans but neither camp has yet come up with anything 
like an inspiring vision for Taiwan’s future.  
Thirdly, one thing that I am surprised about is how little has changed in terms of the poll 
standings of the two camps since my March article. My initial understanding was that Ma 
had a narrow but not unsurpassable lead over either of his potential DPP rivals and that 
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remains the case against Tsai Ing-wen today. In previous elections, like 2000 and 2004 we 
saw huge support swings but so far nothing like that has happened this time. As always we 
need to be highly cautious in how we read Taiwanese election polls, considering political 
bias of the polling organizations and underestimating certain partisan support groups. 
However, it would still only take a minor swing for Tsai to win.  
As is often the case China policy has been central to the campaign. It does seem this issue 
has been more prominent on the agenda than in 2008, where domestic issues were more 
influential. Tsai has proposed a Taiwan consensus, in other words arguing that Taiwan 
should try to find domestic agreement on China/external policies before embarking on 
further agreements with China. I have made a similar appeal in a previous Taipei Times 
article. She appears more pragmatic than Chen on China. But what Tsai has still not really 
explained is how can the DPP engage with China without the 92 consensus? How can she 
avoid the cross-Strait stalemate of 1995-2008?  
Ma’s team have criticised Tsai on vagueness on these same questions, and it will continue to 
reinforce those attack as the election draws closer. There is a widespread perception that is 
to the KMT’s advantage to get the campaign agenda focused on cross-Strait issues. This is 
not necessarily the case. Ma also has unanswered questions on China. He has achieved what 
he set out to on China in his first term. But what are his plans for the next four years? He has 
also been rather vague on this. The peace accord idea is an interesting proposal but this is a 
long-term objective and not feasible in his second term. In fact the whole thing may end up 
backfiring, particularly with his pledge to put any agreement to referendum.  
What I would like to see is more discussion on how the two parties will tackle the pressing 
domestic issues. For instance, the growing gap between rich and poor, how to integrate new 
migrants, promote gender equality, how to reform problematic features of Taiwan’s 
political and judicial systems, just to name a few. Hopefully we will see this brought out in 
the debates and final weeks of the campaign. But I am not too confident as identity and 
external relations often dominate the final hot period of the campaign.  
One of the surprises this year is the Soong Chu-yu’s candidacy, the first potential third 
candidate since 2000. But I still doubt he will have a major impact on either campaign. Many 
assume he will split the pro KMT vote and favour Tsai’s chances. My reading of the polls is 
though he has more sympathy from Blue voters, he also is attracting support from the 
independents and undecided voters that Tsai needs to have a chance of winning. My instinct 
is that most of those Pan Blue voters that sympathize with him will eventually vote Ma, as 
Soong has no chance. It is completely different from 2000 when no one or few really knew 
who was ahead between Lien Chan and Soong in the last weeks.   
So what are the most likely outcomes? 
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We can rule out a repeat of the landslide KMT victories seen in 2008, just as we can the DPP 
winning both elections. The KMT’s incumbency advantage and the bias in the electoral 
system make a DPP legislative majority unlikely this time. The two most possible outcomes 
are first that Ma narrowly wins re-election and the KMT gets a narrow legislative majority. 
The second is that Tsai wins narrowly and the KMT gets a narrow Legislative Yuan majority. 
My view is still that the first is more likely but that the second is still a genuine possibility at 
this stage.  
What would be the implications of such results? 
Although China would prefer the former, neither is particularly promising for its objectives. 
Whoever wins the presidency will face much stronger domestic constraints on developing 
external relations. This could lead to increasing impatience from China.  
But both outcomes could be beneficial good for Taiwan’s democracy. The last four years 
Taiwan has shared some features last seem in late 1980s and early 1990s, in that there were 
no real institutional checks and balances on the ruling party, as the KMT’s majority was just 
so overwhelming. This should make Ma more willing to seek domestic consensus and move 
much slower on relations with China, and hopefully refocus on domestic issues. But another 
more dangerous scenario is that we get a return to the antagonistic and polarized politics of 
the second Chen term.  
If Tsai wins she needs to be able to find a way to work with the KMT majority, something 
that Chen failed at miserably. My own suggestion would be to allow the KMT to form a 
coalition cabinet that also included DPP members and independents. Such an operation 
would again require real cross-party negotiation and compromise. The DPP era showed that 
appointing a premier and cabinet without parliamentary backing would be a recipe for 
disaster.  
 
